The case is such that in September 2013, the former Minister of De- fense Juan Carlos Pinzón stated that "in almost 92% of the territory we can say that we are living in post-conflict conditions, and I immediately clarify what I mean by this: it is not so that there is no insecurity, that there is no violence, that there is no criminality." "What happens is that the crime and the violence which happen are of a different type from those we had and very similar to which the greater part of the countries of medium income in the world with the countries of Latin America have" (Colprensa 2013) .
On that line, the Colombian Defense Minister, Jorge Enrique Bodoya, assured during an interview with El Espectador that "at the present there are 1.030 municipalities (93% of the national territory) where there has not happened a single terrorist attack, along with noting that the FARC are already inactive in 82% of the country" (Gurney 2015) . According to Bodoya, the Army of National Liberation (ANL), a subversive group of minor size, was operating in less than 4% of the national territory, while in 948 municipalities (which is equivalent to 86% of the total) it was allegedly eradicated the presence of neo paramilitary forces known as criminal bands or Bacrim (see Graphic 3).
Source: Developed by the author from a compilation from Gurney 2015. Those statistics could suggest that the armed conflict of Colombia could be coming to its end while the peace talks between the national Government and the FARC advance because, despite the ups and downs they have presenting, until now it has been achieved agreements on agrarian reform, political participation, transitional justice and illegal drugs (Boswotrh 2015) . Good news arriving just when the Colombian armed forces have reached both capacity and size unprecedented (approximately more than 500,000 members), being currently listed as the second largest at the regional level (after Brazil), after more than one decade of strengthening through Plan Colombia.
According to Security Assistance Monitor data, much of the money committed has resulted in the strengthening of the Colombian armed forces because, of the almost $10 billion that United States assigned to such initiative between fiscal years 2000 and 2015, nearly US$ 7 billion were directed to train, assist, instruct and equip the army and police of the Andean country. In other words, approximately 70% of the funds of the referred program are destined to military purposes and 30% to social works (Kinosian and Haugaard 2015) . Following that reasoning, it can serve as an example to mention that in 2002, the U.S. Congress authorized the use of the aid to combat terrorism, and in 2003, Álvaro Uribe launched the Plan Patriota (Patriotic Plan). From there, rather than responding to initiatives of the illegal armed groups, it began to grow the size and strength of the army and the police, enabling them to take the initiative with a more combative approach (González Bustelo 2014) .
Noting the figures of the assistance, it is possible to determine that between 2000 and 2008, the United States economic and military aid to Colombia exceeded US $6 billion, thus being the largest recipient of US aid in Latin America (Tickner 2014,3) and the third in the world (after Israel and Egypt) during the past 20 years. This support was vital in terms of training, and to achieve substantive increase in the capabilities of air mobility, intelligence, communications, coordination and organizational capacity. And while this initiative marked the beginning of an unconditional support to the strengthening of the Colombian armed forces, the former President Uribe also gave a strong boost to these operations. And this was how the defense spending has tripled from 4,000 to 12,000 million dollars, in part through a special tax on property of elites (González Bustelo 2014) .
In the middle of the 2000s, United States had supported operations in numerous departments, and thousands of soldiers had been deployed. But these actions, that could remove the FARC of a determined area, could not avoid its return after the offensive was over. As affirmed by Mabel Gonzalez- Bustelo (2014) , the premise in which they based themselves was that his-v.5, n.10, Jul./Dec. 2016 torically abandoned rural areas could recover only through the participation of the entire Government to regain and strengthen State presence. The doctrine was put up with a strategy in several phases based in military operations, socio-economic projects of fast impact (to win the minds and the hearts) and the establishment of civil institutions of Government. In other words: territorial control, stabilization and consolidation.
Subsequently, the Strategic Initiative for Development was launched in 2009 to support the effort and the consolidation model, trying to provide economic opportunities once the security and basic services had been established. It is an example of the US doctrine of stabilization that attracted important funds of Washington, provided within the framework of the Section 1207 Security and Stabilization Assistance (with funds transferred from the Department of Defense to the Department of State).
Therefore, Colombia was a pioneer in incorporating operations of stabilization and State construction in its military doctrine, reflecting the same trends in the American army. This confirms the thesis that Washington has sought models to reduce the burden on its armed forces in a frame of budgetary restrictions, while at the same time helping allied countries to face challenges of security that exceed widely the military answers. It is worth mentioning, that the United States to some extent has helped create its own reflection in the Colombian armed forces, appreciation that "agrees with the important privileges that the institution already has: coordination and control of the system of Defense by the own military; autonomy in the management and administration of their resources and income; high immunity and absence of control on the part of the legislative on military matters, among others aspects" (Gonzalez Bustelo 2014) . By such reason; questions about the future of that relationship arise, and its implications in the role that the Colombian military forces would play in a post-conflict scenario.
From this perspective, it is possible to hold that Colombia has become a cornerstone for American security policies since after the Iraq (2003 Iraq ( -2011 and Afghanistan (2001 Afghanistan ( -2014 wars, adding the tail of the crisis sub-prime (2008) it has gained importance the approach of moderate intervention or low impact, consisting of special operations with limited direct presence, whose objective is "to teach others countries to fight against the threats for their own security, with armies that fight in the form of networks and in connection, against the transnational networks (terrorism, organized crime and others)" (Isacson and Withers 2013,12) . In this order of ideas, this model of cooperation can be defined as helping others help themselves through human and institutional capacity building, and by means of constant security assistance and of long term. It is here where Colombia comes to play a key role, in both symbolic and practical terms, essentially for the following reasons:
First, from the point of view of its current policy of security and defense, the U.S. Government has justified this strategy based on the widespread idea that the war on drugs it supported succeeded in the Andean country, exhibiting it to the international community as an emblematic case of moderate intervention or low impact given the prolonged duration of such support, the degree of maturity reached in the bilateral military cooperation and the volume of the budgetary releases, as well as the diversity of tasks of State construction undertaken. Robert D. Kaplan explains how Colombia has developed into a laboratory for the tactics that United States would employ to manage complex global problems in the following form: "you generate a product and then let it go" (2006, 53) . What happened in Colombia was exactly that, i.e., a model of cooperation in security designed not only to improve the internal safety of that country, but also applicable to changes in the security objectives of United States in the Western hemisphere and in other parts of the world. This new reading of the bilateral relationship reflects the philosophy that as we help Colombia, Colombia will help us to help others.
The maximum of working by, with and through the (a slogan frequently enunciated by U.S. officials), is the strategic axis of the model of moderate intervention or low-impact as it allows to obtain results at a lower material and political cost. On the other hand, the use of third actors generates a plausible denial or the denial of the knowledge or responsibility over unpopular or illegal activities. As so, "the cooperation through representatives is based on a spirit of body cultivated through a prolonged and repeated commitment with their foreigner counterparts; the existence of first name personal relations, the creation of bonding elements to ensure connectivity and support for the objectives of the host country in order to develop a common purpose" (Tickner 2014,4) . Then, while the construction of capacity continues, the best of the local actors matures.
In second place, Colombia is assuming an important role when it comes to executing programs of American assistance in security, both in Latin America as in Western Africa due to the growing animosity of the US public opinion towards the expensive direct military participation in contexts that are not perceived as a direct threat to the national interests. Hence, United States also recognizes the political and strategic value of Colombia as a delegate that allows the Americans to remove themselves from the first rows and direct from the back with the eagerness of evading the political risks, allowing them to leave a less perceptible footprint in several countries, i.e., without the negative impression of a high military presence. And that without counting the financial costs associated with the direct participation, through a cheap v.5, n.10, Jul./Dec. 2016 strategy that allows the missions to continue as, "it is a lot less expensive for the United States to pay the hosting, the feeding and the military equipment of an apprentice than to finance the travel of a squadron of instructors to a foreigner country. Indeed, the employment of Colombian dependencies and instructors can be up to four times cheaper than the use of American actives" (Kinosian and Haugaard 2015) . Also, senior U.S. officials also see this strategy as a return on the investment made in the Plan Colombia. At a hearing of the Congress in 2013, William Brownfield, former Assistant of the Deputy Secretary of the International Office on Narcotics and Law Enforcement, said: "it is a dividend that we obtain by having invested more than US$ 9,000 million in support to the Plan Colombia" (Alarcon 2013).
As Jim Thomas and Christopher Dougherty claim: "Colombia is an exporter of security nest, and therefore constitutes a key node of an emerging network global of forces of operations special" (2013, 84) . This opinion is shared by the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) David Petraeus, who conceives the Andean nation as one of the firmest allies of Washington in the world and with better willingness to help regions such as Latin America, the Middle East and West Africa. Accordingly, this Alliance seems to reflect "a new was of cooperation in matter of defense based on a conception common of the spectrum of challenges and interests relating to its security." In it, the institutional relations at the hemispheric level guarantee respect for sovereignty and international norms. "These rules and practices are evolving by the need of acting collectively to share the load" (Tickner 2014,5 ).
An exportable model of security?
From the mid of 2000, Colombia has received a growing number of requests of cooperation in security on the part of governments with different ideological trends in all Latin America, which have been treated in an ad-hoc and little systematic manner. However, during the last years of Uribe's administration, there has been a political will to intensively use the main exportable active of the country: the experience and accumulated knowledge by Colombian armed forces, openly considered as one of the most experienced of the world regarding counterinsurgency and the fight against drug trafficking. However, "few governments wanted to be seen working with the former Colombian leader, given his hard-line anti-terrorism speech" (Tickner 2014,6) , following the logic of tell me who your friends are and I'll tell you who you are. For this reason, the arrival of Juan Manuel Santos to the Presidency in 2010 provided an opportunity to advance in this effort because the first represent-ative resorted to the aforementioned improvements in security as a mean to change the predominant narrative on Colombia as a failed State, with a weak history of human rights and some poor democratic institutions. Consequently, a successful history began to be constructed which the Santos government has strategically used as an instrument of foreign policy with the purpose of helping to strengthen the reintegration of Colombia, both at regional and international levels, as an offeror country in themes of security and defense.
As a result of this new priority in the presidential agenda, the Colombian government has designed the International Cooperation Strategy on Integral Security, whose institutional structure is headed by the Ministry of Foreign Relations as civil spokesman responsible for interacting with the soliciting Governments and coordinate the specific efforts of cooperation with the Ministry of Defense and the Presidential Agency for International Cooperation (henceforward, APCI), while the National Police of Colombia and the Military Forces are the institutions responsible for executing such strategy in their respective fields of action. Also, the strategy has been formulated in an international legal framework that comprises the following elements: According to a brochure of the Colombian Chancellery, the initiative is being developed in the bilateral and multilateral fields, looking to share experiences and capabilities with the objective of maximizing the effectiveness in the fight against the organized transnational crime, and in so generating new international standards. In this regard, it should be noted that, according to the same document, the Government projects its relations with countries and organizations from a dynamic point of view, which allows adaptation in a flexible manner to the security challenges of the future, since the definition of schemes of technical assistance and cooperation among States is an effective tool to prevent and tackle crime affecting societies. For this reason, the Strategy emerges as a response to the needs of security cooperation with Latin America, providing to the homologous institutions from the soliciting countries the mechanisms and methods of cooperation, training, technical v.5, n.10, Jul./Dec. 2016 and legal assistance. The question to be answered now is "how is it made?, offering a portfolio of on-demand services in the following areas of cooperation: What is the methodology? Each project of cooperation starts once the Colombian government receives a request of cooperation from a requesting country, through the development of four stages which are observed in the table 3. However, it is disturbing that the specific information about the initiatives of individual cooperation are not publicly available. Parallel to the intensification of the efforts to export its experience to nations of Latin America and the Caribbean through the South-South cooperation, the Government of Colombia aimed at convincing Washington of deepening its commitment with third countries to ensure that the considerable decrease in the funds of assistance registered since 2008 did not translate into a devaluation of the bilateral relations. United States, a forum in which the increase of the training by the Colombian security forces of their Latin American counterparts was a central theme, such as an anonymous Defense Department official said: "we are building a detailed action plan where we and the Colombians will coordinate who does what... so that we can leverage… the resources and capabilities that we have to carry out in an effective manner the work of development of capabilities and training in America Latina" (Isacson and Withers 2013,25) .
Several months later, in the VI Summit of the Americas held in Cartagena, the Presidents Juan Manuel Santos and Barack Obama announced the creation of the US-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation (USCAP) to support the construction of capacity in Central America, the Caribbean and finally, in South America starting from April 2013. This initiative responds to a regional desire to stop the uncertainty caused by the region's criminal organizations, and demands that the United States facilitate the deployment of Colombian trainers to participating countries, as well as the transport of students from the same countries so that they attend military schools and police academies located in Colombia, with the aim of contributing to the ongoing efforts of protecting citizens and counteracting the transnational organized crime in Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama. Thus, "the Department of State with the support of the Department of Defense, directs USCAP in United States, while the Ministry of Defense of Colombia is the manager of doing so in that country" (Roman 2015,68) .
For its part, the International Affairs Office on Narcotics and Law Enforcement started to plan the realization of trainings on the application of law in the participating countries in conjunction with the National Police of Colombia, while SOUTHCOM worked at the same time with Colombian military forces on the development of military training activities. The allies identified and proposed key areas for capacity development and created the first list of events for the four original associate countries comprising USCAP: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama. Costa Rica and Dominican Republic were incorporated in USCAP in 2014.
In a simultaneous manner, the Department of State made political maneuvers to inform to the participating countries, to the United States missions and to the officials of cooperation in security of the SOUTHCOM about USCAP and the areas proposed for the development of capabilities. In the military field, the Southern Command established a kernel to USCAP and coordinated in greater depth the operative aspects and the initial settings of the training agreements with the officials of cooperation in security in the participating countries. Thus, USCAP includes three types of agreements:
In the first place, the Mobile Training Teams (MTT) are responsible for the deployment of the Colombian instructors towards the associated countries to perform complex training, tactical and operational activities of 20 to 25 members of the selected military units personal, usually in the place. In second place, the Subject Matter Expert Exchange (SMEE) are small encounters between 10 to 15 participating experts that discuss an specific topic of interest, usually in rooms of Conference with some visits. In third place, the personal of the participating countries is sent to Colombia to attend schools and academies in the country (Roman 2015,69) .
The agreements of cooperation in matters of military security of US-CAP includes from tactical, technical and infantry procedures to training on Command and Control of the Joint Operations Center, and from border security to aircraft detection and monitoring. USCAP also deals with all the military domains, reinforcing the doctrine of the participating countries, always prioritizing the rights human and considering the military support for the civilian agencies, when appropriate. Indeed, the popularity of USCAP increased as did the number of events from the original 19 events in 2013 to 55 in 2014 and 85 in (Roman 2015 .
The kernel of USCAP in SOUTHCOM performs the planning and operational synchronization of all the events of military capacity development of USCAP in close coordination with members of the joint personal of the Command, the Deputy Minister of Defense of Colombia, the Military Forces of Colombia, the components of the US foreign service, the Secretariat of the National Guard of United States, the officials of cooperation in security and the participating countries. The allies meet during two planning and synchronization workshops in order to manage and coordinate the continuous training and at the same time comply with the growth requirements.
The planning of USCAP requires that all the allies work together to ensure that the program carries out the proposed events as they were planned, as well as their activities of development of capabilities in the areas agreed. The workshops are very specific and require a considerable preparation to ensure that the participants obtain the maximum benefit. The planning for the workshops begins with the development of templates that include the key areas of development. The officers of cooperation in security work together with the military forces of the applicant countries to identify the type of military training necessary to meet the requirements of the key development areas. Once the countries agree on the types of training considered more urgent, the list is sent to the military forces of Colombia to be reviewed and for determining what type of training will comply with the established requirement.
On the other hand, with the beginning of the peace dialogues be-v.5, n.10, Jul./Dec. 2016 tween the Colombian Government and the guerrilla in November 2012, the diplomacy of security, as the once Minister of Defense Juan Carlos Finch called it, acquired an additional urgency because if the armed conflict that has lasted more than half a century was supposed to end, the current size and capabilities of the Colombian armed forces, its vast experience in different types of missions including the State construction, and the new demand for their knowledge will add a new dimension to the challenges of the post-conflict situation. Hence, in any stage of the transition towards peace, the following elements would inevitably be addressed: the responsibility by alleged violations to human rights, the adjustment of doctrines, the operational state of the military force and the budget to the new reality (probably, under a process of reform in the security sector, as happened in El Salvador and Guatemala). Notwithstanding, the close link with the Pentagon and the new international activism can provide the perfect argument to justify that military budgets remain high, in order to respond to internal and external threats. In effect, during the 2013 accountability of the Ministry of Defense to the Congress it was exposed the game plan of the Government of Santos to put this excess capacity in use abroad (Bargent 2015) . Following that reasoning, it is essential to note that in June 2013 Colombia signed a Convention with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a global partner for access to their bank of good practices, being the first of its type with a country of the subcontinent, this will increase right away their participation in peace operations (El País 2013). Also, it is worth highlighting that in the framework of the Union of South American Nations it has acquired a leading role in the creation of the Council for strengthening the cooperation in citizen security, justice, and against the transnational organized crime; besides its active participation in the South American Defense Council regarding the World Drug Problem.
Ultimately, senior governmental officials of both nations have claimed that joint security activities abroad are of vital importance to achieve their respective goals: for Colombia it involves consolidating its projection as a regional and global leadership and the planning for the post-conflict situation; while for United States it represents the continuity of an effort to interrupt the flow of illegal drug through its borders and combat the criminal violence and State weakness in the Western hemisphere.
"All inclusive" service
According to a 2014 report of the Department of Defense, that U.S. agency has intensely backed the programs of security training offered by Colombia. Although "it supervises, manages and observes the training activities, there appears to be little control of them as there is no sufficient capacity to monitor them all" (Kinosian and Haugaard 2015) . For that reason, it is vital to establish a system of monitoring and evaluation to determine the quality, the utility, the effectiveness or the consequences of these programs. Furthermore, a Government source stated that the selection process of students is designed, but not for teachers. Neither there is a review of the contents of the courses, which allows that Colombians tropicalize the American curricula. In other words, they are allowed, without supervision, to put their personal stamp to the contents. Many of these courses are taught in Colombia, "but instructors also travel to recipient countries, either for short training or for extended periods to teach in war schools or in police academies" (Kinosian and Haugaard 2015) . American Government officials have confirmed that although Colombia pays the wages of instructors, United States pays travel expenses, accommodation and meals for teachers and students.
In fact, during 2013, United States supported 39 assistance activities in which a total of 619 students were trained (see Figure 1) . In 2014, that number was increased by 152, as a result 6.526 police and soldiers of 10 countries of the Western hemisphere received training, more than five times the number of staff trained in 2013 (see Figure 2 ) . (Kinosian and Haugaard 2015) .
Supporting that version, a PowerPoint presentation prepared by the Ministry of Defense points out that a total of 9.720 training activities were carried out for members of Latin American armed forces between 2010 and 2013, focusing mostly on Central America, with 5.061 training activities (see Figure 3) .
Similarly, it is appropriate to point out that the Office of International Affairs of the National Police of Colombia reported that "between 2009 and 2013, it provided training to 21.949 people from 12 countries of the subcontinent in skills such as land, air, maritime and river interdiction, police testimony, explosives, intelligence operations, psychological operations, and JUNGLE Command, the elite program of anti-narcotics police designed with the backing of the United States" (Tickner 2014,3) . Despite the variety of nationalities trained, it is possible to conclude that Colombia has focused on a group of countries where the distinct problems related with drugs have emigrated, among the Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. It can serve as an example that within the framework of the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) the National Police of Colombia participates in a Project of Regional Police Reform in Central America, funded mainly through the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) of the Department of State.
In so being, the courses include topics related with financial crimes and confiscation of actives in Nicaragua, police intelligence in El Salvador, judicial and fiscal protection in Guatemala, basic riparian operations in Panama, tactical answers in Honduras, land interdiction, fixed and rotatory wing pilots in Costa Rica, handling of informants, citizen security, and operations of civil affairs in Dominican Republic. Also, it is worth mentioning that "the National Police of Colombia provides training and assistance in themes such as communitarian patrol, training of instructors of the Police Academy, and development of training curriculum for Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica and Panama" (Tickner 2014,4) , according to the press release of v.5, n.10, Jul./Dec. 2016 April 2013. Similarly, it should be highlighted that in 2014 about 160 Paraguayan soldiers belonging mostly to the special forces, received training from the Colombian army in counterinsurgency operations given the upsurge of attacks by the Paraguayan People's Army (EPP in Spanish), the small but troublesome Marxist guerrilla of the guarani country. Indeed, both Governments have sustained that EPP receives training from the FARC, and that a faction of the Paraguayan guerrilla known as Armed Peasant Association (ACA in Spanish) is acquiring the same organizational dynamics of the Colombian insurgents, reason by which a parallel exchange of knowledge between the security forces of the guarani country and Colombia is considered as a natural response (Obando 2015) .
In that same direction, the U.S Government has stimulated Peru to work more closely with Colombia, as said the once Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta during a visit to Lima in October 2012: "the United States is ready to work with Peru in joint planning, exchange of information and trilateral cooperation with Colombia to address our shared concerns on security" (Isacson and Withers 2013,26) making direct allusion to the control exerted by remnants of Sendero Luminoso on drug trafficking in the region of the Valley of Apurimac, Jan and Mantaro rivers (VRAEM in Spanish).
Furthermore, Mexico requested advice from Colombian officials that pursued Pablo Escobar with the objective of recapturing Joaquin El Chapo Guzman, highest leader of the Cartel of Sinaloa, who escaped from a high security prison in July 2015. Hence, three retired Generals, recognized by having finished with the leaders of the cartels of Medellin, Cali and Norte del Valle in the 1980s and 1990s (this includes Pablo Escobar, chief of the Cartel of Medellin and the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers, heads of the Cartel of Cali), traveled to that country to share their experiences with the Aztec authorities that were after the trace of El Chapo (LaFuente 2015) .
The risks associated to a non-traditional export
Although Colombia has a vast experience in the type of operations that police and armed forces must perform today in Latin America (such as investigations on organized crime, drugs interdiction, efforts to arrest the drug barons, among others), the expansion of its training raises certain concerns, especially when the American Government is paying the invoice.
First, the Colombian authorities have said that all of its international training programs use the same protocols regarding human rights as the ones used within its armed forces. However, "few different mechanisms of investigation on human rights have seem to be implemented to ensure that the worst practices, as corruption and impunity, are not transferred by Colombian instructors along with the best ones" (Tickner 2014,8) . Henceforth, before promoting Colombia as an example in security subjects, the United States should require a detailed report on what teachings are being exported to members of security forces in other latitudes.
To that respect, Jose Miguel Vivanco, director of Human Rights Watch for the Americas said: "it is clear that United States has not been able to carry out a serious analysis or a scrutiny of the actions committed by the Colombian security forces with the training, intelligence and equipment offered by the Government of United States during all these years" (Lohmüller 2015a). This is worrying considering that the Colombian armed forces have been denounced by breaking human rights, including 3,700 alleged extrajudicial executions, also known as false positive (a practice that consists in reporting civilian deaths as fighting enemies), the greater part of which occurred between 2002 and 2008.
According to Human Rights Watch, more than 800 members of the Army (active or retired) have been convicted as part of the scandal of the false positives (Lohmüller 2015a). However, so far no officer has been convicted with the rank of Brigade Commander or senior positions. Indeed, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has expressed interest in analyzing the widespread and systematic pattern of the extrajudicial executions in Colombia, in so far as "there are enough reasons to believe that [these acts] were committed due to a policy adopted at least at the level of certain brigades of the armed forces, which constitutes a State policy or of an organization for committing crimes against humanity" (Lohmüller 2015a).
For this reason, it is important to determine the unwanted results that may arise when emphasizing certain indicators to measure the positive impact of the efforts against organized crime because "variables that use the security forces to measure success, and the reward system to encourage desired outcomes, may pervert the fight against enemy groups and lead to widespread abuses. In fact, by placing an emphasis on the number of enemy fighters killed as a measure of success in operations (something that has been called the counting of bodies syndrome), and to reward those who have greater results in this regard, the Colombian army created a mentality that led to the systematic practice of false positive" (Lohmüller 2015a) ."
This caused that the count of fatalities became a misleading and dangerous representation of the progress on combating non-State armed actors. Also, it is crucial to perform a strict supervision of the forces responsible for v.5, n.10, Jul./Dec. 2016 executing the government policies and to punish the responsibles for abuses, because as the Colombian experience shows, not engaging in it can give space to widespread violations of the rights of those that the government supposedly aims to protect.
Linked to the former, it is possible to hold that the export of the Colombian model did not seem to measure the results that came along with providing security. I.e., the goals of the process, as the number of hectares fumigated, must not be confused with the real results, as the damage that illegal drugs cause in the society. Precisely that took place in Colombia, "those US officials continuously mistook the achievements of the process with real results. However, soon they realized that there is a significant gap between reaching the objectives of eradication and truly influencing the trafficking of drugs, or between increasing the count of bodies and establishing the presence of a functional State in territories without law" (Isacson and Haugaard 2011,18) . For example, despite the fact that it is one of the indicators used to measure success, the rate of impunity (the proportion between crimes, verdicts and sentences) often says more about the initiatives against crime than the number of arrests, courts built, or trained prosecutors.
Regarding the anti-narcotics policies, the data about the price and the purity of the drugs for sale in the streets indicates if the supply is being affected, although it is complex to determine if an apparent trend is a mere noise in the short term or a powerful sign in the long term. Another type of indicators, perhaps even more important, are the changes in the damage caused by the drugs, such as the size of the population consuming or the trend of the crimes related with the drugs and the sanitary emergencies (Isacson and Haugaard 2011) .
On the other hand, exporting the Colombian security model as a cooperation strategy does not seem to contribute for strengthening the capacities of the civil government, reducing impunity, or creating opportunities for the excluded sectors. I.e., strengthening the government cannot only mean the deployment of the military through the national territory because, if the representatives of the government, in this case the military forces, commit abuses against the human rights or acts of corruption with impunity, their presence could be more harmful than beneficial, especially for the internal cohesion of the State.
Strengthening the civil government means ensuring that no vulnerable sector of the population lives without government. The areas without law do not exist in a vacuum: they are occupied by criminal groups that threaten the population. If something has been made clear by the Colombian experience is that State should assume much more than the presence of armed forces or police in the streets, because if it is true that security is the most basic of public goods that a State must provide to its citizens, the military occupation per se cannot generate the necessary conditions for economic prosperity or the exercise of basic freedoms. Consequently, the military occupation of these spaces is useless when the rest of the government (education, health, public works and justice) do not arrive quickly.
In fourth place, it is somewhat ironic that Juan Manuel Santos, the first President in the world to make a public request for a sincere and informed debate on the advantages and shortcomings of existing strategies on the drug issue, is also exporting, together with the United States, some of the basal elements of the militarized focus which according to him deserve closer examination. Therefore, it is to be seen if the current programs of anti-narcotics training can adapt to the citizen security needs of the receptor countries of the cooperation between Colombia and the US, without necessarily reproducing the discredited and, often, counterproductive logic of the War against the Drugs.
In that sense, and based on rising rates of violence and drug trafficking in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador (sub-region known as the Northern Triangle), James Stavridis (2015) has argued that the United States must work with these nations to apply some of the many valuable lessons learned in Colombia. This includes a combination of factors as external help, local determination and diverse key tools to face the security problems. Consisting, according to him, of a strategy of intelligent power (Smart Power): a combination between diplomacy, economic and financial security, and help to the development. I.e., something that the United States supposedly effectively accomplished in Colombia and can now do in Central America.
Notwithstanding, invoking the imaginary of Colombia when speaking of helping other Latin American countries is a dangerous simplification of the challenges the region faces in matter of security. Indeed, the analogy made by Stavridis (2015) is based in superficial similarities, completely omitting key differences between the situation of Colombia in the end of the 1990s and the countries of the North Triangle of Central America today, which open serious questions on the convenience of using the Andean nation as a model to follow. one another) that evolve in the place with total impunity, being supported in part by the local population. See: Bartolomé 2015, 204. v.5, n.10, Jul./Dec. 2016
For example, the sources and territorial nature of the violence and insecurity in the North Triangle are different from the Colombian situation. The most obvious contrast is related to the absence of an active insurgency or a network of paramilitary groups, given that the main threat of security in that sub region is urban crime (such as kidnapping and extortion) by gangs such as the Mara Salvatrucha and District 18. And in contrast to the Andean country, the drug trafficking organizations that operate in Central America are conveyors, as in the geopolitics of the drug this area is used mainly for the transit of drugs and laundering of actives (Lohmüller 2015b).
And although certain military capabilities (as the obtaining of intelligence) are necessary for dismantling the transnational criminal organizations that operate in the region, the military consultants offered by Colombia are of little use to Central America, because the challenge posed by the gangs requires performing a stronger police work and reinforcing the capacity of the police for investigating crime; likewise, a criminal and judicial system that actually works is also needed. Therefore, it is possible to hold that the configuration of a Colombian model for its extrapolation to so different contexts as the described previously, expresses a disproportionate symbolic construction and a strategic myopia on the part of United States.
Conclusions
Throughout this work it has been analyzed how the Colombian government has seen in its International Cooperation Strategy on Integral Security a useful tool that has allowed:
• Changing the predominant narratives of failed State to those of security exporter country with the aim of successfully reinserting the country in the international concert; • Strengthening its relationship with United States raising it to a strategic plan as a reliable partner at the regional level (guarantying the continuity of their assistance); and • Facing the process of restructuring the Armed Forces with an approach to post-conflict situation.
In this sense, the size and current capabilities of the Colombian Armed Forces added a new dimension to the challenges of post-conflict because, in any stage of transition to peace a considerable reduction of staff is present, raising the following questions: what to do with the surplus? And how to channel the skills of the military toward other activities? This is essential in order to avoid an eventual criminalization of their members insofar as there is concern about the vacuum that the organized crime may fill in the Colombian illegality once the FARC leave the weapons behind, leading to a new cycle of crime and violence in the Andean country.
Similarly, it has been able to note that this security cooperation scheme has proved to be beneficial for the United States given that outsourcing the police-military assistance through Colombia, has allowed the US to direct from behind in accordance with the model of moderate or low impact intervention that Washington is currently pursuing, avoiding all the financial and political costs that it entails. However, it is disturbing to observe that despite the impunity of the corruption scandals and violations of human rights, particularly the extrajudicial executions (or false positives) led out by the Colombian security forces, Washington continues to show Colombia at a world level as a successful example in the War against Drugs, not giving great importance to the counterproductive effects that this model of security generates.
Finally, while it is undeniable that Colombia has acquired significant experience in counterinsurgency and anti-narcotics operations after half a century of armed conflict, Latin America is not Colombia; that is, the policy-makers should be cautious when using the Colombian experience as a roadmap to advance actions in the region, avoiding indiscriminately applying their lessons as universal recipes, thus ignoring the particular territorial nature of violence and multiple sources of insecurity in other nations that are not in a situation of conflict, such as Mexico and the Northern Triangle of Central America.
Indeed, the clearest contrast between both situations relates to the absence of an active insurgency or a network of paramilitary groups, as the main threat of security in these nations is the crime at the urban level (such as kidnapping and extortion), led by cartels such as Los Zetas and Los Caballeros Templarios in Mexico or by gangs such as the Mara Salvatrucha and District 18 in Central America. It is worth mentioning, in the case of Colombia we are talking of a non-state armed actor with political and ideological motivations, while in Mexico and the North triangle there are illegal actors with purely economic motivations. And in contrast to Colombia, the drug trafficking organizations that operate in Mexico are managers and the ones operating in Central America are conveyors, in the geopolitics of the drug this area is used mainly for the transit of drugs and laundering of actives.
